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Critical Theory was born at a dark moment in world history. The Weimar
Republic in Germany had given way to National Socialism, fascism reigned in
Italy, and the Bolshevik revolution in Russia had begun its descent into the
whirlpool of Stalinism. It became clear that "class consciousness" does not
spring fully formed from economic crisis, as many Marxists had imagined, and
that socialist democracy is far more difficult to achieve than even its enemies had
believed. Nowhere was this more apparent than in Germany, wherein 1933 the
proudest and strongest labor movement in history fell victim to a grotesquely
reactionary regime. Democracy in every form seemed alarmingly fragile, too
feeble and embattled to resistthe "dictatorship of the corporals" that MaxWeber
had feared.
This was the context in which the renowned "Frankfurt Institute" began its
odyssey from traditional to critical theory. Founded just a decade beforeHitler's
triumph, the Institut far Sozialforschung had originally been a bastion of
Marxist orthodoxy. In July, 1930, however, Max Horkheimer became the
second director of the Institute. Under Horkheimer's guidance, the Institute
became the source of a new and profoundly original kind of social theory. It is
ironic that, in recent years, Critical Theory has come to be regarded as a kind of
Olympian culture-eritique, resting on the foundation ofa fashionably postmodem
metaphysic. In its origin, and in the large majority of its endeavors, the
Frankfurt Institute was committed to what Horkheimer originally called a
"unified," "interdisciplinary" Sozialwissenschoft, For a quarter of a century,
Horkheimer and a galaxy of associates - Herbert Marcuse, Erich Fromm, and
Theodor Adorno, among others - pursued multidisciplinary research on an
expanding scale from thestandpoim of ancri tical" noo-Marxism.1 Their"goo'l "--
was to penetrate beneath the surface of society .todiscem its inner historical
tendencies and, if possible, its Achilles' heel, This led them in the direction of a
1. For further data on this multidisciplinary effort, see Dubiel (1985), Kellner
(1989), Wiggershaus (1986) and Jay (1973). This research began with an
important survey first reported by Erich Fromm in Autorita: und Familie
(Horkheimer, Ed., 1936). The second great collective work on this theme -
- The Authoritarian Per-sonality (Adorno et al., 1950) - is still considered
a milestone in the history of social psychology. This is not to say,
however, that Critical Theory did not have a 'postmodern' tilt at times.
This was evident in Dialectic of Enlightenment (Horkheimer and Adorno,
[1944] 1972), and later crystallized in Adorno's Negative Dialectics ([1966]
1973) and JargonofAuthenticity ([1964] 1973).
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synthetic social theory, in which philosophy and the social sciences were to join
hands.
The first step on this path was an empirical survey of the Weimar
proletariat, initiated by Horkheimer and Fromm in 1929. The results were
disturbing. It appeared that even many avowed liberals and radicals were
susceptible to the blandishments of authoritarian reactionaries.Z Fascism, it
seemed, had roots not only in "material conditions" but in character structure.
"For the masses would hardly succumb to the brazen wink of untrue
propaganda," as Adorno observed later, "if something within them did not
respond to the rhetoric of sacrifice and the dangerous life."3 The mission of
"unified theory" was hence to supplement Marx's critique of political economy
with a parallel critique of political psychology: "To be able to come to terms
with fascism it was, therefore,considered necessary to complete social theory by
psychology,and particularlyby analyticallyoriented social psychology.,t4
Hitler's victory forced the Instiua into exile, where, in 1934, it became the
International Institute of Social Research at Columbia University, in friendly
proximity to thesociology department of MacIver and Lynd. Herbert Marcuse,
who was the rustmember of the Institute to settle at Columbia, played a leading
role in the ensuing aniculation of Critical Theory. In pathbreaking essays on
fascism,authority, philosophy,and social theory, Marcuse helped to fashion the
unique blend of philosophy and social science that became the Institute's
hallmark. Like Horkheimer, who rust distinguished between "Traditional and
Critical Theory" in 1937 (see Horkheimer [1937] 1972), Marcuse synthesized
elements drawn from Hegel, Marx, Weber, and Dilthey.5 The intent was to
produce a "comprehensive theory" in which "the relative truths" of different
outlooksand disciplinescould be integratedinto a unifiedwhole.6
Ideally, in other words, social theory should be constructive as well as
critical. For Max Horkheimer, the "traditional theorists" of orthodox Marxism
fell far short of this ideal. Their fatal error, he said, was to assume that class
consciousness will be "necessarily generated in the proletariat" when
circumstances dictar.e.} In fact. however, class consciousness is inherently
2. For details, see Erich Fromm ([1939] 1984)and Wolfgang Bonss (1984).
3. Theodor W. Adorno (1967),p. 68. See Smith (1992) for an elaboration of
the logic and implicationsof this outlook.
4. Ibid., p. 68.
5. Weberand Marx are the mainsources of inspirationin Marcuse'sessays on
fascism ([1934] 1988) and authority ([1936] 1972) and in Horkheimer's
"Egoismand the Freedom Movement" «(1936] 1982-83); see also Fromm
(1941). Hegel and Dillhey are readily discernible influences in Marcuse's
"Philosophy and Critical Theory" «(1937] 1988) and in many other essays
by bothHorkheimer and Marcuse.
6. Max Horkheimer(1939), p. 324.
7. Max Horkheimer([1937] 1972),p. 213; emphasis mine.
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problematic. Under most ordinary circumstances, working people ~onsider
capitalist society to be natural and impe~~hable -.and they ~n tum elthe: left
or right under the stress of economic cnsis. M~lsts ~ho fad to ~sp thl~ -:-
who serenely await deliverance from the C~8!Isma~c prol~tarlat - limit
themselves to wishful thinking and watchfulwaning. ~aIlh ~d.Irrelevance.. Yet
this is precisely what traditional theory enshrines ~s Its principle, H.or1c!telmer
says. "The intellectual is satisfied to proclaim Wl.th ~everent. adm~ralJon th~
creativestrength of the proletariat and fmds sausfacuon In~pting himself~o It
and in canonizing it. He fails to see that such ~ ev~slon of t~eoretlcal
effort...and of temporaryopposition to themasses(whichacbv~ theoretical effort
on his part might force upon him) only makes the masses. blinder and w~er
than they need to be."·8 Critical theory canplaya construcnve .rol~, Horkhel~er
says, by helping tip the scales in favor of "a reasonableorgamzanon of society
that will meet the needs of the whole community."9 Theory "...should be a
critical,promotive factor in the development of the masses."10
Critical Theory and Sociology .. ..
Herbert Marcuse had just begun to movein the direction of C~bcal Theory
in this sense when he published "On the Critique of Sociology" In 1931. As
recentlyas 1928,when hehad publishedhis first article,Marcuseh~ advoca~ed a
quasi-messianic Marxism of the kind espo.used.by Georg Lukac~ In C!eschichte
und Klassenbewusstein.U No one had idealized the. p~oletanat With ~ea~r
apparent sophistication than Lukacs, and Marcuse willingly followed In hIS
footsteps. By 1931, however, he had evolveddecisively beyond~~cs tow~ds.
Critical Theory. In a cycle of writings stretchingfrom 1928 until his entry Into
the Frankfurt Institute in 1932, Marcuse underwenta radical me~moIJ?hosis.l?
His first essay, written shortly after the a~pearance of !dartJ.n Heldeg~er s
renowned Sein und Zeit in 1927, was utopian and unsociological, a cunous
amalgam of Lukacs and Heidegger. Not longafterwards, h~weve~, M~use~
. a far more subtle stance in a series of little-known e~says, mcludlng- ~ur Krit~_.
der Soziologie," and in a notable but neglected monograph,Hegel~ O'!'ti!I08.'~. _
.unddieGrundlegung einer Theorieder Gesc!"chlichhit.13 . •
Intellectual historianshave placed considerable emphasis on Mar~use s.early
sympathy for Martin Heidegger, with whom he studied at the University of
8. Ibid., p, 214.
9. Ibid., p. 213.
10. Ibid., p. 214.
11 . Lukacs([1923] 1971).
12. For details, see the comprehensivebibliography in Kellner (1984).. .
13. "Zur Kritik der Soziologie" appears here in English for the first ~me; It
first appeared in Die Gesellschaft in 1931. Hegels Ontologie w~s
published in 1932; see the excellent translation by Seyla Benhabib
(Marcuse,[1932] 1987).
3
Mid-American Review 0/Sociology
Freiburg from 1929-1932. Habermas, for example, calls ~ar~use the ~ounde~ of
ttHeideggermarxismus," and others claim that he was P?~ly a Hel~egge~an
existentialist in thisperiod, rather than a Marxist.14 This IS ~ravely ~Islea~ng.
In reality, Marcuse turned to Heidegger in the hope of find!ng a philosophical
grounding for a specifically Lukacsian view of .class consciousness. Sein u~
Zeit was, in its own way, as utopian as Ges~hichte ,un~ K~assenbewusste.'n.
Seeing a kind of elective affrnity between .Heideggers thln~ng and Lukacsien
Marxism, Marcuse sought to ~nite the two.m a gra!'d synth~I~. ,.
The influence of Lukacsian themes IS especially plain In Marcuse s first
essay.lS Like Lukacs, Marcuse was acutely aware that the empirical prole~t
is seldom if ever "class conscious" in the ideal-typical sense. But neither
Marcuse or Lukacs was unwillingto concede that the fa~ of the working class is
strictly circumscribed by its empirical status at any given moment. They
believed, on the contrary, that the "mission" of the working class is to function
as .....the identical subject-object of history whose 'praxis will change reality,"
and that the empirical limits of proletarian consciousness will be transcended as
history unfolds.16 No maner how submissive or conservative the working class
might be empirically, its "mission" is to coalesce into a "class for-itself, II with
emancipation from class ruleasits ultimate tendency.17
This conclusion, as Lukacs remarked, "throws an entirely new light on the
problem of reality. If, in Hegel's terms, Becoming now appears as the truth of
Being, ...then...the developing tendencies of history constitute a higher reality
than the empirical1acts'."18 This was precisely the point of Marcuse's claim
that Marxist theory "culminates in the discovery of historicity
(Geschichllichkeit) as the basic parameter of human existence..."19 The term
"historicity," which figures prominently in Sein JUJd Zeit, was borrowed by
14. See Habennas (1957, p. 230, n, 88). See Morton Schoolman (1980) for
the view that Marcuse was a lapsed Marxist in this period. The related
claim that he was a Heideggerian is advanced by Alfred Schmidt ([1968]
1988) and Robert Pippin (1988).
·15. "Beitrage zu einer Phanomenologiedes Historischen Materialismus," This
appeared in July 1928 in Philosophische Hefte, pp. 45-68;. see .the
translation, "Contributions to a Phenomenology of Historical
Materialism," in Telos 4, 1969.
16. This phrase appears in Lukacs ([1923] 1971), p, 197. Similar formulas
may be found on pp. 149, 189, 206, and passim. In a similar vein,
Marcuse ([1928] 1969,p. 10) writes that the proletariat will be "the subject
of history... when it grasps and recognizes itself as the object of
history.....
17 . Marcuse makes this point repeatedly. See, e.g., Marcuse ([1928] 1969), p.
11.
18. Lukacs ([1923] 1971),p. 181.
19. Marcuse ([1928] 1969),p. 4.
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Heidegger from the philosopher Dilthey, who borrowed it, in turn, from Hegel.
Marcuse adapted this concept to argue that the "Becoming" of history is "a
higher reality" than its empirical immediacy. Like Heidegger, he rigorously
distinguished historical Being and Existence (Sein und Dasein), calling Being the
unfolding of necessity, revealed but also hidden by Existence. Adopting
Heidegger's category of "thrownness" (Geworfenheit), Marcuse emphasized that
Existence is "thrown" before us empirically. But Being, as necessity, is ulterior
to Existence. Historicity, the "Being" of history, is thus the ontological ground
of "thrown" Existence. This is wholly Heideggerian. But now Marcuse departs
sharply from Heidegger to say (a La Lukacs) that "historical necessity" is linked
to revolution. For Marcuse, unlike Heidegger, Being is the Becoming of social
transformation.
Marcuse concludes with a remarkable expression of Lukacsian optimism.
Speaking, like Heidegger, of a personified Dasein- in this case, the proletariat
- Marcuse concludes that revolution is inevitable. "There is a Dasein whose
thrownness consists precisely in overthrowing its own thrownness. Today,
historical action is possible only as action of the proletariat, because the
proletariat constitutes a Dasein which necessarily contains this action." Such
action reveals not only the historicity of the proletariat but the "necessary
decadence" of bourgeoissociety.20
This argument revealed a rather stunning utopianism, which Marcuse would
soon outgrow. His progress was revealed in an article "On the Problem of the
Dialectic" (1930-31), in which Marcuse praised the philosopher Siegfried Marck
for his balanced approach to Lukacs. In Marek's hands, Geschichte und
Klassenbewusstein is "scrutinizedandappreciated in its essential significance for
the development of Marxism, which cannot be overestimated."21 Marek
defended Lukacs from his mediocre critics, but also "identifies the weak point in
Lukacs' dialectic: the concept of 'correct class consciousness'. This notion, like
the conception of class consciousness in general, is a violation of the dimension
of historicity, a structure 'outside' of events from which an. artificially abstract . ~ .:
connection with history must beproduced~"22
By accepting Marek's criticism of Lukacs; Marcuse implicitly rejected his'
own earlier LuIcacsianism. He took an additional step away from messianism by
conceding that Heidegger, too, was probably an unreliable guide to "history and
historicity."23 Yet, instead of discarding the idea of historicity, Marcuse
20. Ibid, p. 33. I've slightly altered the translation.
21 . Marcuse ([1930-31] 1976), p. 24. As Kellner points out (1984. p, 388, n.
20), the published translation inverts this point, wrongly saying that the
relevance of Geschichte und Klassenbewusstein is "not to be
overestimated...
22. Marcuse ([1930-31] 1976), p. 24. I've slightly altered the translation.
23. Ibid., pp. 23-24.
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reaffirms it. In effect, he condemns his earlier approach to historicity as - a
violationof the principle of historicity.. .
Marcuse's conception of this principle had evidently changed. In brief, he
seems to have accepted a basicallyneo-Kanti'!n critiqu~ of ob~tiv~tM~ism.
The ramifications of this point are far-reaching. Whde studying In Freiburg,
Marcuse had pursued a critical analysis of several rival philosophies of history
and social science. "Thereal field of knowledge," heconcluded, "is not thegiven
fact about things as they are, but the critical evaluation of them as a prelude to
passingbeyond their given fonn:"24 This o~inio~ led h~.~ repeated criticisms
of positivism (especially the logical and sociological posiuvism of Otto Neurath
and the Vienna Circle) and phenomenology (most notably Max Scheler's
"material eidetics").25 But the neo-Kantianism which reigned in many academic
circles was more complex, and Marcuse showed a correspondingly complex
attitude towards it. He was especially intrigued by the various forms of neo-
Kantiansocialismwhichemanatedfrom the so-called"Marburgschool"and from
leadingSocial Democratssuch as MaxAdlerandOttoBauer.26
Autonomy and Necessity
Inspired by Kant's defense of reason and moral autonomy, the Kantian
socialists leveled many serious charges against the shallow "orthodoxy" of
Kautsky, Thalheimer, and other Marxist materialists. The~ ar~ued, most
fundamentally, that reason and moral will play a greater role In history than
official Marxism concedes. By treating "the subjective factor" as an
epiphenomenon of the economy, Marxists fall victim 10 an objectivist teleology
24. Marcuse([1941] 1960),p. 145.
25. A Vienna Circle manifesto in 1929affmned that "there is knowledgeonly
from experience, which rests on what is immediately given" (Neurath et
al .• [1929] 1973, p. 11). Marcuse linked this to Husserlian
.....phenomenology: .. "Phenomenology is:..~n. principle adescript.ive
philosophy: it always aims only at describing what IS••• The theore~~al
.mdicalness .which' seemed "audible in [Husserl's] call, 'To the" things
themselves!' reveals its quietistic, indeed positivist character as
phenomenolo~y progresses" ([1936] 1988, pp, 5~;60). ~cheler's value,:
theorywas indictedeven more sternly,as a form of receptiveheteronomy
in which reason collapses, without residue, into "recognition" (Ibid., p, 63;
and cf. p.44).
26. HermannCohen and Paul Natorp were the leading figures of the Marburg
school, which also included Rudolf Stammler, Karl Vorlander, and Ernst
Cassirer. With the "Baden school" of Rickert and Windelband, the
Marburgers formed the core of Germanneo-Kantianism. Adler and Bauer,
both of whom were key figures in Austrian Social Democracy, were well
known partisans of neo-Kantian epistemologyearly in their careers. See
KOhnke (1991),Willey (1978),vander Linden(1988)and Keck(1975).
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in which reason and free will are reduced to moments in "a process of natural
history."27 In this teleology,even what Marxcalled "the.leap into the realmof
freedom" (the revolutionary transition from capitalism to classless society) is
conceived in a determinist fashion, as the "necessary" outcomeof an ineluctable
objective process.28 Even revolution is "determined," it seems, by material
rather than subjectiveforces.
Objections to this determinism were expressed with particularinsistenceby
Hermann Cohen and the Marburg school. It is wrong, Cohen wrote, "to
representon the one hand everything asthe productof economic forces, whileon
the other hand moral tasks are seenas fearful apparitions and as post-historical
forces that appear as sheet-lightning in the hitherto dark historical sky."29
Rudolf Stammler, voicing "standard criticisms from the neo-Kantian arsenal,"
said that "the cardinal mistake of the Marxists [is] to interpret the human
condition causally," rather than as a realm of subjectivity and autonomy.30
Moral choice, the neo-Kantians argued, is not bound by the same causal
principles that apply to mere objects. The "realm of freedom" must be freely
chosen. It is not an inevitablecausal fate. .
Marcuse first considered this line of reasoning in a series of essays on
leading neo-Kantian socialists, including Marek, Max Adler, the renowned
"Austro-Marxist" who broke new ground withKantund derMarxismus (1904),
and Marburg philosopher Karl VorUlnder, who was by far the most systematic
advocate of a Kantianized Marxism.31 This is the framework in which
Marcuse's commentary on Siegfried Landshut'sKritik. der Soziologie becomes
most readily intelligible. Landshut's negativejudgementsof Hegel, Marx, and
Weber closely resemble the customaryneo-Kantian critiqueof Marxism. Hegel,
we are told, saw people as "instruments manipulated by the Cunning of
27 . This is a characterization of Marx's view of history by the Russian
economist I. I. Kaufmann, which Marx quoted approvingly in his
"Afterword to the Second German Edition" of Capital; seeMarx ([1867]
~~?),p~ _18." .. . .... _. _. .. .' "..
28 '. .Marx's -fullest statement about the prospect of a leap to the realm of
freedom appears at the end of Vol. 3 of Capital (see Marx [1894] 1981,p.
959).
29. Cohen (1904, p. 38) cited in van der Linden (1988, p. 265). Cohen's
reference is to Marx's view that "history" and freedom will only begin in
classless society, and that, until then, humanity will subsist in the
"prehistory" of heteronomy.
30. Willey (1978, p. 126), citing Stammler (1921, pp. 23, 56-57).
31 . Vorlander stressed in 1926 that the "jump into freedom'...cannot be
postponed to an undetermined future but must already start in the
present..... See Vorlander(1926, p. 348),cited in van der Linden(1988, p.
297).· Most of Marcuse's early essays on neo-Kantian socialism are
collected in his Schrlften, Bd. 1 (1978).
7
Mid-American Review ofSociology
Reason"; Marx viewedgroups and individuals as the "productsof...relationships"
which are "functional or even causal" in nature; and Weber treated this as the
"basic presupposition" of sociological method. This, Landshut says, devalues
people and reducesfreedom to causality. The alternative is a viewpointbased
on "all the categories that originallydetermined the individual person as human
- freedom, happiness," ete.32
Marcuse felt a very real affinity for Landshut. Both belonged to a small
circle of socialists who studied under Heidegger, and both wanted sociological
inquiry to probe the "historicity" and "questionability" of capitalist society.33
But Marcuse felt that Landshut was wrong to say that Hegel and Marx "derived"
humanity from the worldor reducedreason to causality. In fact, Hegeland Marx
had originated a profound new conception of history in which ego and
environmentare conceivedasopposing butindivisible moments in a "dialectic"
of change.34 Landshutfailed to grasp precisely this aspect of "transformation,"
which Marcuse calls"thepropercategory of historicity...discoveredand grasped
by Marx on theground worked by Hegel..."35 Eager to deny that humanity is
"derived" from the world,Landshutre-createsthe very "disjunction" of humanity
and world for which he had blamed Hegel and Marx - by overstating the
independence of personality. Landshut'sconceptof "historicity" is too one-sided,
Marcuse says, to balancesubjectand object, His Kritik der Soziologie is, in the
end, too Kantian.36
32. See "00 the Critiqueof Sociology," below,for a fuller report of Landshut's
views. For Landshut, Marx was the key figure in this drama, the
proponent of the "sharpest form" of the causal "derivation" of humanity
from theworld.
33 . See Katz(1982),pp. 66, 76. Landshut won a permanentplace in the annals
of Marxology by editing Marx's early writings (Marx, 1932). He later
edited Alexisde Tocqueville and analyzed Jewish culture and society (see,
e~g., Landshut1950).. . -'.~
34. In Hegels Ontologie Marcuse anticipated the work of M~rQI.(I.Westphal
(1990).' Bothsay that Hegel'sPhenomenology ofSpirit ([1807] 1977) is a
deeplyhistorical workwhichis subvertedat the end by Hegel'sreversion to
the ideal of the tran-scendental knowing subjecL Hegel's Science ofLogic
([1812] 1969) is similarly divided, Marcuse says, between a valid
exposition of the forms of "historicity" typical of "being," "essence" and
"life" and a disappointing conclusion which returns Hegel to the idee fixe
of an absolute epistemological ego.
35 . Marcusehesitated to use the word "dialectic," which often served moreas a
dogmaticslogan than as a conceptual aid (see Marcuse ([1930-31] 1976).
In HegelsOntologie. he thus argues entirely in terms of historicity.
36. Kant, of course, tended to derive the world from the subject. Marcuse feels
that Landshut leans too far in this direction in his zeal to oppose
objectivism.
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Marcuse prefers to view humanity and the world through the prism of a
wider, more integratedconception of "historicity" which he defmes in the rather
obscure language of "motility" (Bewegtheit), "unfolding" [Geschehen), etc. It
should be noted, first, that these are technical terms, drawn from Marcuse's
reading of Hegel's Logic,37 as explained in Hegels Ontologie. This study
contains a wealth of close reasoningon "the fundamental character of historical
happening."38 The .main premise is that "what happens" in history "happens"
in a unique sense. "Historicityis what defines history and thus distinguishes it
from 'nature' or the 'economy'," Marcuse writes. Historicity signifies the
meaning we intend when we say of something that it is 'historicaI'."39 The
nexus between historicity and Geschehen (happening or unfolding) and
Bewegtheit (motility) "is suggested by the very word 'history' (Geschichie).
What is historical Igeschi-chtlich), happens (geschicht) in a certain manner.
History will beour concernas a processof happeningand a form of motility."40
This premise, of course, is purely formal, and can never be a substitute for
concrete historical study.41 As Marcuse later noted vis-a-vis Sartre, "strictly
philosophical analysis...abstracts from the historical factors which constitute
empirical concreteness."42 Such "meta-historical" analysis flees before "the
inv~ion of real history," which involves "the action and reaction of specific
SOCial groups under specific historical conditions": manual workers,
entrepreneurs, sales clerks, writers, and others.43 Yet Marcuse does not retreat
from the view that there are typical forms of movement in history. In his
magnum opus, Reason and Revolution, he still seeks to pierce the surface of
events,"to discern the underlying logic of change. Like Marx, he "regardsevery
37 · Marcuse offers a new approach to theLogic which, he says ([1932] 1987,
p. 325), has few precedents. Amongolder authors,hecites Trendelenberg.
The most noteworthy recent contribution, he says, is a study by Ernst
-Manheim (1930). For Manheim's insights into CriticalTheory, see the
. present issue of this journal, . ... .
38. This is a phrase from a postcardcited by Benhabib,-(1987~ p, xii), -
39. Marcuse(1932),p. 1.
40. Ibid., p. I. Compare Heidegger, whose translators write: "Ueschichte'...
stands for the kind of 'history' that actually happens" (as opposed to
'Historie', which refers to written history). Beingand Time ([1927] 1962),
p. 30, n. 1.
41 · Marcuse felt that phenomenology and existentialism gave in to this
temptation. In lieu of the abstract knowing subject they had placed "an
equally abstract 'his-toricity'," falling short of the goal set by Dilthey. when
he urged research into historicity as a means of probing the "real life
process"([1936] 1988,p, 78).
42. Marcuse(1948), p. 161.
43. Marcuse (1948), pp. 189, 175.
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. historically developedsocial form as in fluid movement,and therefore takes infO
. . "44account its transient nature not less than Its momentary existence....
The originality and lasting value of Critical Th~ry i~ tha.t It takes both
sides of the dialectic seriously. Autonomy and necessity, hlstonca.l move~ent
and the empirical present, change and "the given" - all. merit attenuon,
Although, at the beginningof his literary car~r, Marcuse beh~ved that ~ople
are carried along by waves of historical necessity, he~n r~lzed that history,
unlike nature, is a realm in which freedom and ca~sabty plar mterwove~ parts.
"There can be no blind necessity," as .he wrote In 1941, In tendencies that
terminate in a freeand self-conscious society."45
Marcuse shared this insightwith neo-Kantian socialists like VorUlnder. But,
unlike the "rather dry" neo-Kantians,46 Marcuseand his fellow critical theorists
recognized that the "autonomy" of the hU~31'! s.pirit cannot simp~y beaffirmed,
but is, in fact, problematic. Whether an Indivld~~ or ~ c~se IS more ~r less
"free" at any given moment is an empiricalques~on Whl~h IS ~ot suscepl1~le 10
a priori deduction. Under the pressure of SOCIal relations m the .family or
elsewhere, conduct may become"compulsive" in a way that removes It fr~m the
realmof autonomy in Ihepure sense. Authoritarians, for example, who yield ~
paranoiddelusionsor compulsions,are plainly nor"free" in a pur~ sense. Yet It
would be wrong to conclude that freedom is impossible,.a chimer~.. It was
precisely the genius of the F~kfurt School.~ make this an emplfic~ and
historical question. In no other Intellectual tradibon has theh~~ potential~~
self-detenninationbeenscrutinized with equal care. FromAutorllal undFamilie
to Reason and Revolution and The Authoritarian Personality, the Critical
Theorists made freedom and democracy their paramount concerns. They
translated philosophical theorems into a researchagenda- reapi~g a rich harvest
of questions, data, methods, and insights. Marcuse'searly reflectionswere a step
on this path.
44. Marx ([1867] 1967,p. 20).
45. Marcuse ([1941] 1960), p. 318. For an elaboratio~ of this point, see the
excellent book by Marcuse's widow, the late Enca Sherover-Marcuse
(1986). . ...
46. This is Marcuse's apt designauon of the neo-Kanuanism of his day, as
reportedin his interview with FrederickOlafson([1977] 1988),p. 96.
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